[Chapter 5 focuses on police violence. Something I don’t understand is the issue that the Brazilian people on the one hand support the ‘tough’ police and sometimes even want to have a stronger police, on the other hand they consider the police as being corrupt, cowardly, dangerous and even stupid. The attitude seems to be ambivalent. The following interview comes from a men (22) from Jardim das Camélias, (Poor working-class periphery).]
‘Many times, when there is a robbery, the neighbors say. “it was that one, that one.”But the police say, “We haven’t caught him in the act, so we don’t arrest him,” and they go away. And what happens? The guy wants vengeance and goes around killing a lot of people, as it happens today. When a crime happens on the street, the population doesn’t collaborate with the police because of that… It’s the fear of vengeance (…). If I see a robber killing someone, I won’t want to know anything about it. I’ll pretend I haven’t seen anything. If the police ask me, I’ll say, “I haven’t seen anything.”
‘They [the workers, JvB] are paralyzed between the fear of the police, fear of criminal’s vengeance and, (..) a belief that the justice system is unable to provide justice.
SECURITY AS PRIVATE MATTER
The rise of private security is seen as one of the basics of urban segregation, that in Brazil started during the military dictatorship. Security was privatized in order to drive back the large amount of bank robberies. Caldeira distinguishes three different types of guards active in the city.
First the official guards. To become an official guard in you have to finish a 120 hour course, provide by a private enterprise. After that the private guards are allowed to ‘carry .32- or .38-caliber guns, but only while they are at their posts. The guns are owned by the companies and not by the guards. (…) The owners of private enterprises realize the increasing desirability of their services and the potential for expansion in a deeply unequal society afraid of high crime rates and unable to count on its police forces.’ In Brazil there is a rising tendency to see the private security sector as something for the rich and the middle-classes, and the public sector as something for the poor. José Luiz Fernandes, president of the national association of private security enterprises (Abrevis) has said: “Leave the civil and the military police for the less favored, according to the law – which does not work!”
The second segment in the security market is the so called ‘organic security’. The people that work in this industry have formal labor contracts but are registered under other occupational categories. A lot of shopping centers, offices complexes, condominiums, ect, rely on this type of security. ‘Approximately 50 percent of private security services in the state of São Paulo are provided by organic security.
The third type is the illegal ‘clandestine security’ market, most of the people that work there are either policeman or ex-policeman. Despite the fact that it is forbidden by law a lot of policeman do combine the ‘private’ and ‘public’ job, in many cases they use their police weapons. Some of the enterprises closed by the federal police were run by ex-policeman involved with the Esquadrão da Morte or other vigilante groups. The costs to hire these kind of security guards are lower than the guards from the formal market. Also in this segment is used by condominiums.
The phenomenon of the justiceiros is a typical example of the vague border between public and private and the relativity of the sovereignty of the state when it comes to law and justice. The justiceiros ‘literally “justice makers,” are groups of men who kill people they consider to be criminals, especially on the periphery.’ In many cases this is the only access the poor have, when it comes to justice. Also for example shopkeepers use the power of the justiceiros in order to keep the neighborhood save from criminals.
‘With the spread of private security, the discrimination against the poor by “security” forces becomes twofold. On the one hand, the poor continue to live, work, and shop in fortified enclaves, using private security services to keep the poor and all “undesirables” away, the poor will be victims of new forms of surveillance, control, disrespect, and humiliation.’
Caldeira is convinced that the role of private security is a reason for the increase of violence because crime is removed from the judiciary system. Especially the judiciary system is very effective because it makes ‘vengeance from a private into a public matter. She uses the arguments given by the French social scientist René Girard quoting him from his book Violence and the Sacred (1977): “Our judicial system (…) serves to deflect the menace of vengeance. The system does not suppress vengeance; rather, it effectibely limits it to a single act of reprisal, enacted by a sovereign specializing in this particular function. The decisions of the judiciary are invariably presented as the final word on vengeance.” It is the judiciaries lack of authority, and therefore also a lack of credibility that the cycle of violence still exists. The violent police makes a this even worse.
Caldeira doesn’t want to make the easy conclusion that the cycle of violence has a direct relation to poverty. Although she states that ‘most of the elements that have generated the current cycle of violence have a socioeconomic basis,’ and that ‘poverty and inequality (…) are crusial to explaining some of the inequalities’ and ‘the spread of violence,’ to Caldeira it is in the first place the incapacity of the institutions that are the main raison for the cycle of violence.
Caldeira, T.P.R. City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in São Paulo, University of California Press, 2000, p. 158-210.
Showing posts with label judiciary system. Show all posts
Showing posts with label judiciary system. Show all posts
Saturday, August 29, 2009
Thursday, August 27, 2009
City of Walls: Summary Chapter 3. THE INCREASE OF VIOLENT CRIME
‘The increase of violent crime is the result of a complex cycle that involves such factors as the violent pattern of reaction of the police; disbelieve in the justice system as a public and legitimate mediator of conflict and provider of just reprisal; private and violent responses to crime; resistance to democratization; and the population’s feeble perception of individual rights and its support for violent forms of chastisement [Dutch: tuchtiging, JvB].’
‘The majority of occurrences of larceny [Dutch: diefstal, JvB], robbery, and physical abuse, then, are not reported to the police. People either do not trust the police to deal with conflicts and crime, or they fear them because of their well-known brutality. Similarly, the justice system is perceived as ineffective by the majority of the population.’ In the southeast region of Brazil, 50.71 percent did not used the justice system after they were involved in a conflict.
Torture is something that is applied very often by the civil policemen, especially for the poorer suspects. The rich sometimes pay the police to find the people who robbed them, contrary to the poor who are neglected when they are being robbed. The upper-class also sometimes pay the police to torture the suspects.
Caldeira want to make clear that the statistics reporting crime are not so reliable. This because of the corrupt police, but also because the people do not report all of the things that happen to them. Another reason why the statistics are not accurate is because of the different branches in the organization of the police apparatus.
‘Increases in violence have been lower in the center, where the wealthier population lives, than in the outskirts, where the majority of the population is poor. (…) the rates of crimes against property are highest in the upper- and middle-class neighborhoods, whereas the rates of homicide are highest in the poorest districts of the city.’ (…) A recent study (…) showed that the districts with the highest incidence of homicide had a bad quality of life and a predominance of low-income families. (…) the districts with the highest murder rates were mostly very poor’ or lived in deteriorating central districts of the town. ‘The lowest rates were among middle- or upper-class districts in central areas.’ However, the districts with the highest robbery rates where also the wealthy and central districts. The increasing amount people that is in possession of a gun (legal and illegal) is significantly increasing. Caldeira sees this a sign that people ‘increasingly taking the task of defense in their own hands. Also the increasing trade in drugs is followed by more violence, ‘however, such claims are difficult to confirm because of the lack of concrete information.’
In order to understand they way crime works in a city like São Paulo Caldeira uses the following explanations:
1.) ‘crime is related to factors such as urbanization, migration, poverty, industrialization, and illiteracy.’
2.) ‘it is connected to the performance and characteristics of the institutions in charge of order: primarily the police, but also courts, prisons, and legislation.’
3.) ‘cultural elements such as the dominant conceptions about the spread of evil and the role of authority, and the conceptions about the manipulable body.’
4.) ‘the widespread adoption of illegal and private measures to combat criminality.’
5.) ‘policies concerning public security and patterns of police performance: the violent action of the state’ makes the situation only worse instead of controlling it.
The problems with criminality are not easily solvable with more investment in public security. The expansion of investment that started in 1984 did not effect the increase of crime and violence. We should also take in consideration that the ‘delegitimating of the judiciary system as a mediator of conflicts and [the] privatizing the process of vengeance’ only makes violence and crime worse.
Caldeira about the relation between poverty and crime: ‘The association of poverty and crime is always the first to come to people’s minds in discussion about violence. Moreover, all data indicate that violent crime is unevenly distributed and affects the poor especially. However, inequality and poverty have always marked Brazilian society, and it is hard to argue that they alone explain recent increases in violent criminality. Further, this argument often misrepresents violent criminality by allowing the view that poverty and inequality lead to poor people’s criminality. In reality, if inequality is an important factor it is not because poverty correlates directly with criminality, but rather because it reproduces the victimization and criminalization of the poor, the disregard of their rights, and their lack of access to justice.’ (p. 137) Also the behavior of the police is one of the reasons according to Caldeira, not so much their number of officers or their equipment. [My own experience close to the school was also very frightening. JvB]
Caldeira, T.P.R. City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in São Paulo, University of California Press, 2000, 105-137.
‘The majority of occurrences of larceny [Dutch: diefstal, JvB], robbery, and physical abuse, then, are not reported to the police. People either do not trust the police to deal with conflicts and crime, or they fear them because of their well-known brutality. Similarly, the justice system is perceived as ineffective by the majority of the population.’ In the southeast region of Brazil, 50.71 percent did not used the justice system after they were involved in a conflict.
Torture is something that is applied very often by the civil policemen, especially for the poorer suspects. The rich sometimes pay the police to find the people who robbed them, contrary to the poor who are neglected when they are being robbed. The upper-class also sometimes pay the police to torture the suspects.
Caldeira want to make clear that the statistics reporting crime are not so reliable. This because of the corrupt police, but also because the people do not report all of the things that happen to them. Another reason why the statistics are not accurate is because of the different branches in the organization of the police apparatus.
‘Increases in violence have been lower in the center, where the wealthier population lives, than in the outskirts, where the majority of the population is poor. (…) the rates of crimes against property are highest in the upper- and middle-class neighborhoods, whereas the rates of homicide are highest in the poorest districts of the city.’ (…) A recent study (…) showed that the districts with the highest incidence of homicide had a bad quality of life and a predominance of low-income families. (…) the districts with the highest murder rates were mostly very poor’ or lived in deteriorating central districts of the town. ‘The lowest rates were among middle- or upper-class districts in central areas.’ However, the districts with the highest robbery rates where also the wealthy and central districts. The increasing amount people that is in possession of a gun (legal and illegal) is significantly increasing. Caldeira sees this a sign that people ‘increasingly taking the task of defense in their own hands. Also the increasing trade in drugs is followed by more violence, ‘however, such claims are difficult to confirm because of the lack of concrete information.’
In order to understand they way crime works in a city like São Paulo Caldeira uses the following explanations:
1.) ‘crime is related to factors such as urbanization, migration, poverty, industrialization, and illiteracy.’
2.) ‘it is connected to the performance and characteristics of the institutions in charge of order: primarily the police, but also courts, prisons, and legislation.’
3.) ‘cultural elements such as the dominant conceptions about the spread of evil and the role of authority, and the conceptions about the manipulable body.’
4.) ‘the widespread adoption of illegal and private measures to combat criminality.’
5.) ‘policies concerning public security and patterns of police performance: the violent action of the state’ makes the situation only worse instead of controlling it.
The problems with criminality are not easily solvable with more investment in public security. The expansion of investment that started in 1984 did not effect the increase of crime and violence. We should also take in consideration that the ‘delegitimating of the judiciary system as a mediator of conflicts and [the] privatizing the process of vengeance’ only makes violence and crime worse.
Caldeira about the relation between poverty and crime: ‘The association of poverty and crime is always the first to come to people’s minds in discussion about violence. Moreover, all data indicate that violent crime is unevenly distributed and affects the poor especially. However, inequality and poverty have always marked Brazilian society, and it is hard to argue that they alone explain recent increases in violent criminality. Further, this argument often misrepresents violent criminality by allowing the view that poverty and inequality lead to poor people’s criminality. In reality, if inequality is an important factor it is not because poverty correlates directly with criminality, but rather because it reproduces the victimization and criminalization of the poor, the disregard of their rights, and their lack of access to justice.’ (p. 137) Also the behavior of the police is one of the reasons according to Caldeira, not so much their number of officers or their equipment. [My own experience close to the school was also very frightening. JvB]
Caldeira, T.P.R. City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in São Paulo, University of California Press, 2000, 105-137.
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